CCH® Healthcare Compliance — 03/09/10

Medical assistant's sentence upheld for fraudulent billing

A medical assistant who had pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud involving the submission of fraudulent Medicare claims through a medical clinic that provided treatments to HIV patients was properly sentenced, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The medical assistant admitted that he falsified medical records to reflect that patients had received treatments and knew that his co-conspirators billed Medicare for medically unnecessary procedures and procedures that were never provided.

Withdrawal from conspiracy. On appeal, the medical assistant objected to the fraud loss amount that was used as the basis of his sentence because he withdrew from the conspiracy by leaving his employment during the fraud scheme. To prove withdrawal from a conspiracy, an individual must show that: (1) he took affirmative steps, inconsistent with the objectives of the conspiracy, to disavow or defeat the objectives of the conspiracy; and (2) he made a reasonable effort to communicate those acts to his co-conspirators or disclosed the scheme to law enforcement authorities. The mere cessation of participation in the conspiracy is insufficient to prove withdrawal.

The medical assistant did not take any action to thwart or disrupt the objectives of the conspiracy but only removed himself from the situation and ceased participation. The medical assistant failed to present any evidence that he communicated to his co-conspirators that he was leaving his employment out of a desire to end his involvement in the conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court's finding that he was responsible for losses that accrued after he left his employment was permissible because he did not withdraw from the conspiracy by leaving the company.

"Sophisticated means." The medical assistant next objected to the district court's enhancement of his sentence as a result of the offense involving "sophisticated means". Section 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provides for an enhancement of two levels if the offense involved "sophisticated means", which is defined as "especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the education or concealment of an offense." Given that the relevant offense was conspiracy, it was permissible to consider the reasonably foreseeable actions of the medical assistant's co-conspirators when determining whether the enhancement applied.

The medical assistant knew that chemists manipulated patients' blood samples before sending samples to the lab. Manipulation of patients' blood samples constituted "especially complex . . . conduct pertaining to the . . . concealment of the offense" and, therefore, involved "sophisticated means." Accordingly, the district court's two-level enhancement was permissible.

Minor role reduction. The medical assistant argued further that he was entitled to a minor role reduction. Section 3B1.2(b) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level reduction for a minor participant, which is defined as an individual "who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal." To determine whether an individual was a minor participant, a court must assess whether the individual was a minor or minimal participant with respect to his relevant conduct.

Contrary to the medical assistant's argument, the unnecessary treatment of patients and falsification of records were instrumental in avoiding detection of the conspiracy and in the success of the conspiracy. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the medical assistant played a significant role in the conspiracy, not a minor role.

Reasonableness of the sentence. Another contention on appeal was with the reasonableness of the district court's sentence. The district court was required to impose a sentence that was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

To be procedurally reasonable, the sentence must be based on: (1) the sentencing range calculated according to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and (2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) in arriving at a reasonable sentence, which included, among other things, the seriousness of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the kinds of sentences available.

The medical assistant's sentence was sustained as procedurally reasonable because the district court considered the necessary sentencing factors and the parties' arguments, and explained its reasons for imposing the sentence. For instance, the district court considered the medical assistant's administration of unnecessary medication to patients, and the harm caused to society by stealing money from Medicare for over a year and a half.

To be substantively reasonable, the district court must examine the totality of the circumstances, including consideration of whether the §3553(a) factors support the sentence. The Eleventh Circuit ordinarily expects a sentence within the guideline range to be reasonable; further, the medical assistant had the burden of establishing that the sentence was unreasonable in light of the record and the §3553(a) factors.

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the medical assistant's sentence was substantively reasonable given that the medical assistant routinely injected patients with unnecessary medications and falsified medical records for a year and a half. The district court noted that these actions affected not only the patients, but also taxpayers who fund the Medicare program and citizens who receive Medicare benefits. The sentence was also supported by the need to deter medical professionals from committing Medicare fraud.

Judge-found facts. The medical assistant's final argument was that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence based on facts found by the court. However, at the time the medical assistant was sentenced, the court was permitted to enhance his sentence based on judge-found facts as long as the sentence complied with an advisory guidelines system and did not exceed the statutory maximum. Given that the district court complied with both of these requirements, the medical assistant's sentence was affirmed.

U.S. v. Carrazana, 11th Cir., Jan. 27, 2010, Health Care Compliance Reporter, ¶800,831

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